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Amidst the triumphalism of the West after the fall of the Soviet Union, Derrida contextualised his 
reading of Marx and Marxism with the statement: ‘[t]he world is going badly, the picture is bleak, 
one could say almost black… A black picture on a blackboard’ (1994: 97). He fleshed out this claim 
with a list of ten plagues aimed squarely at the self-congratulatory moment encapsulated by 
Fukuyama’s End of History. Deriding the latter as a ‘tiresome anachronism’, Derrida noted that its 
proponents, seemingly content to ‘puff out their chests with the good conscience of capitalism, 
[and] liberalism’, had ‘arrived late to the apocalypse’ (1994: 17). With an incredulity as pertinent 
today as it was in 1994, he asked: ‘[w]hat cynicism of good conscience, what manic disavowal could 
cause someone to write, if not believe, that “everything that stood in the way of the reciprocal 
recognition of human dignity, always and everywhere, has been refuted and buried by history”?’ 
(1994: 97-8, citing Allan Bloom). The central task of Spectres of Marx was thus to trace the Marxian 
inheritances by means of which this bleak era might be navigated, and its evangelical champions 
challenged. Twenty-five years later, as the world has deteriorated further and liberal triumphalism 
has given way to anxiety, unrest, and emergency - with even the likes of The Economist asking “was 
Marx right?” – we might fruitfully look to Derrida with the same intent.  
Contemporary readers cannot fail to recognise Derrida’s prescience in rehabilitating Marx – 
or at least Marx’s ghosts. But it also appears that Derrida chose the wrong Marx: after the financial 
crisis, it is the critique of capital – Marx’s searing analysis of the capitalist mode of production’s 
tendency towards crisis and failing profitability – that has witnessed a resurgence. Derrida, by 
contrast, conjures the eschatological Marx of the Communist Manifesto and The German Ideology, 
who remains out of fashion even amongst Marxists. Yet a closer reading reveals so much that is of 
urgent and contemporary relevance, if we take the ‘spectre’ to be more than an illustrative motif. 
Derrida draws extensively on Walter Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ to locate the 
power of Marx to haunt the present in a transgression; specifically, Marx’s use of idealism to 
(re)animate his historical materialism. As Benjamin explains, in Marx thought ‘[t]he puppet called 
‘historical materialism’ is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the 
services of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep out of sight’ (1999: 245). 
We have discussed this theological inheritance, which Marx acquires through Hegel, elsewhere (Hirst 
2013; Houseman 2013; see also Löwith 1949; and Taubes 2009). Through his ‘hauntology’, however, 
Derrida is able to recognise the grammar of this inheritance as less a question of Judeo-Christian 
eschatology than Marx’s awkward – or maybe even playful – relationship with the actual/ideal 
binary.  
In Spectres of Marx, communism acquires its power in the bourgeois present as a persistent 
irritant that calls into question capitalism’s claims to justice and victory, through a contradictory and 
deeply theatrical temporality, in which communism haunts from the future (1994: 2-3, 10-21). This 
‘hauntology’, as Benjamin Noys notes, ‘rests in the oddly meta-ontological position of that which 
pre-emptively ruins the security and primacy of ontology by forcing it to open to the event’ (2012: 
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27). The ‘effectivity’ of communism, and by extension the eschatological Marx, is for Derrida 
dependent on this spectral disorganisation of the temporal order (the ‘chain of presents’): ‘the logic 
of the ghost … points toward a thinking of the event that necessarily exceeds a binary or dialectical 
logic that distinguishes or opposes effectivity or actuality (either present, empirical, living—or not) 
and ideality (regulating or absolute non-presence)’ (1994: 78). Communism incarnated - so-called 
‘actually existing communism’ - therefore, necessarily forfeits this spectral power. Derrida’s exegesis 
of Marx thus seeks to maintain the suspension of the actual/ideal binary – a suspension that the 
figure of the spectre produces. Doing so allows Derrida to make sense of the ‘irreducible 
heterogeneity’ (1994: 10) of Marx’s work, and, following Blanchot, defend it against those who ‘in 
the name of Science or Theory as Science, had attempted to unify or to purify the ‘good’ text of 
Marx’ (1994: 10). Marx’s enduring power, and our responsibility to our Marxist inheritance, for 
Derrida, flows from the former’s disruptive and subversive transgression of the actual/ideal binary. 
This transgression can be seen for instance Marx’s historiography, in which the free, ideal, self-
conscious society is simultaneously a mechanical consequence of a teleological history composed of 
class antagonism, and at the same time the work of human revolutionary agency (to which he 
devoted himself to the point of infamy, financial ruin and ill health). This transgression runs through 
the other Marx, too: his critique of political economy is a materialist account of economic relations, 
but where commodity fetishism is a necessary explanatory ingredient. For Derrida, to close these 
spectral contradictions, to decide that Marx is an economist or a humanist, a scientist or a 
philosopher, is to surrender the power of his thought – a risk Marx himself invites, for instance in his 
critique of Hegel and Stirner (1994: 150-155). 
If Derrida locates Marx’s power in the post-Cold War years as flowing from his transgression 
of the actual/ideal binary, it is because he identifies in that period a fixation with actuality and 
effectivity. The various discussions in Spectres of Marx of Fukuyama’s End of History point to this: 
the claim that the ideal has finally become the actual is really the actual’s claim to being ideal. In 
Derrida’s words, in the triumphalist mode  
[o]n the one hand, the gospel of politico-economic liberalism needs the event of the good 
news that consists in what has putatively actually happened… [H]owever since, on the other 
hand, actual history and so many other realities that have an empirical appearance 
contradict this advent of the perfect liberal democracy, one must at the same time pose this 
perfection as simply a regulating and trans-historical ideal. Depending on how it works to his 
advantage and serves his thesis, Fukuyama defines liberal democracy here as an actual 
reality and there as a simple ideal (1994: 78). 
Fukuyama’s opportunistic deployment of the actual/ideal binary to serve his own rhetorical 
purposes is, as Derrida notes, clear. However, his framing of the actual as ideal is haunted by its 
manifest untruth, as Derrida set out in his ten ‘plagues’ (1994: 100-104), and it is precisely this 
haunting that animates the mania, anxiety, and darkness that Derrida reads behind the veil of liberal 
triumphalism. In light of this, in an era in which positivist empiricism, hard-headed business 
rationality, neoliberal economics, and liberal-democratic institutions proclaimed their objective and 
proven superiority over other ‘contenders’, the power of Marx’s spectral logic is, for Derrida, 
activated rather than obviated. Marx’s critical materialism, ostensibly ‘scientific’ anti-idealism, and 
famous disdain for utopian thinking gives his work a purchase that those easily dismissed as 
dreamers and fantasists lack. But it is the spectral element in his thought – which smuggles into the 
realm of actuality something heterogeneous to it: the promise and hope of something different – 
which offers an antidote to the oppressive actuality of the neoliberal moment. 
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Returning to Spectres of Marx today, though, we must ask if this antidote – the spectral 
hope of communism, or perhaps simply the spectre of hope as such – is adequate to the current 
poisons. After the 2008 financial crisis, it is no longer counter-intuitive to affirm, as Derrida did in 
1994, the potency of Marx, though it is not the spectral or even eschatological Marx that is enjoying 
a resurgence but rather the materialist prophet of capitalism’s tendency towards crisis. Liberal 
triumphalism has given way to increasing polarisation as electorates around the world abandon 
business-as-usual centrism in favour of various stripes of nationalism and outright fascism, at the 
same time as a resurgence and rebranding of socialism is in evidence, even in the US. Far from being 
a preserve of philosophy, apocalyptic imaginaries have become a mainstay of Hollywood and small 
screen alike. This apocalyptic pessimism is presciently prefigured in Spectres of Marx. As Antonio 
Negri commented in 1999, ‘[t]here’s something that’s exhausted in these pages, like the shadow of 
that melancholic libertinism when, at the end of another counter-revolutionary age, men who were 
still free testified in refusal to the Counter-Reformation and awaited the martyrdom of the 
Inquisition’ (cited in Noys 2012: 43). In Derrida’s own words, ‘never, never in history, has the horizon 
of the thing whose survival is at stake (namely, all the old models of the capitalist and liberal world) 
been as dark, threatening, and threatened’ (1994: 65). Indeed, in this abject epoch, time itself is, 
according to Derrida, out of joint. He asks: ‘what happens when time itself gets “out of joint,” dis-
jointed, disadjusted, disharmonic, discorded, or unjust? Ana-chronique?’ (1994: 25).  
Despite this apocalyptic thread, however, read today Spectres of Marx seems imbued with 
an insistent, if ethereal, optimism. In spite of, or in response to, the irreducible bleakness of the 
post-Cold War world, Derrida asked: ‘can one not yearn for a justice that one day, a day belonging 
no longer to history, a quasi-messianic day, would be finally removed from the fatality of 
vengeance?’ (1994: 25). This optimism took the form, as this suggests, of a messianic promise of 
something different to come. Purged of an arrivant, even of the expectation of an arrivant, Derrida’s 
was a despairing messianism. He explains: ‘without this latter despair and if one could count on what 
is coming, hope would be but the calculation of a program… [T]his despairing messianism has a 
curious taste, a taste of death’ (1994: 212). Here, as elsewhere, Derrida is clear that such a ‘to come’ 
refers not to any actually existing future present, but rather to the structure of faith in a justice 
always deferred in temporal terms. And yet, this messianism has the structure of a promise, of the 
horizon. This vision leans towards the future, ‘deferring not what it affirms but deferring just so as to 
affirm, to affirm justly, so as to have the power (a power without power) to affirm the coming of the 
event, its future-to-come itself’ (1994: 19). In an always-deferred future to come, then, something is 
affirmed. As this suggests, and as Noys deftly argues, visible in Spectres of Marx is a ‘weak 
affirmationism’. Derrida explains: it is ‘a matter of linking an affirmation (in particular a political 
one), if there is any, to the experience of the impossible, which can only be a radical experience of 
the perhaps’ (1994: 42). To this extent the messianic, Derrida claims, ‘is always revolutionary. It has 
to be’ (1994: 211). As horizonal hope, the, the future haunts the present, insisting on the question of 
‘what can be, the eventual disruption and opening of the living present to a future ‘to come’. 
Hauntology inscribes the imminent necessity of events that will disrupt the “hell of the same”’ (Noys 
2012: 45, citing Baudrillard). 
Indeed, and more concretely, Derrida noted in Spectres of Marx that signs of positive change 
were already in evidence, specifically in the form of a New International. This ‘link of affinity, 
suffering, and hope’, he claimed, would involve ‘a profound transformation, projected over a long 
term, of international law, of its concepts, and its field of intervention.’ We have, he continued, 
‘more than one sign of it’ (1994: 105-6). As Noys echoes, in 1994 ‘Derrida insisted, with some 
justification given the emergence of the alter-globalisation movement, that the ‘New International’ 
‘is already a reality’. However, in the current time, that reality, he continues, has ‘entered a state of 
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routinisation and seeming decline, which again raises the question of Derrida’s tendency to futural 
invocations of agency’ (Noys 2012: 42). This decline - manifest in current the rise of the far right, 
ecological emergency, and the global proliferation of affronts to human and civil rights – forces us to 
ask whether Derrida’s promise of the future-to-come, understood not as a future reality yet to arrive 
but rather as the structure and possibility of hope itself, has been broken. In a world which feels 
increasingly horizonless, what place can the ‘to come’ have? In post-horizonal times, has hope itself 
become an anachronism? 
The idea of the disappearance of a horizon is not new, from Adorno’s 1956 claim that ‘for 
the first time we live in a world in which we can no longer imagine a better one’ (Adorno and 
Horkheimer 2011: 108) to the Sex Pistols’ 1977 declaration of there being No Future. But within the 
framework of Spectres of Marx, we can trace the specific configuration in which the horizon Derrida 
articulated no longer quite makes sense. Hope, in the form of Marx’s eschatological spectre, receives 
its potency from a moment of idealism smuggled into an otherwise deeply materialist project – the 
dwarf behind the automaton – which aimed to crack open capitalist political economy not from an 
external moral viewpoint but through a rigorous and immanent critique (Bonefeld 2001). Marx’s 
potency as a challenge to an eternal bourgeois society consists in his agreement with its anti-
metaphysical, anti-romantic, anti-utopian self-image. It participates, albeit critically, in positivism’s 
obsession with the actual, the injunction to value-freedom which itself belongs to bourgeois 
rationality’s fixation with the self-interested, calculating individual. Das Kapital is difficult to dismiss 
as the work of a dreamer. But, as Derrida uncovers, a purely rationalist Marx surrenders that power; 
Marx’s materialism gives him the power to haunt the sterile actuality of the bourgeois present, but it 
is the moment of idealism – eschatological communism – that does the haunting. The timeliness of 
Marx’s spectres, then, is indexed to the cult of actuality, of materialistic rationality, that 
characterised bourgeois society. This directs us to paying greater attention to what has changed 
since the early 1990s; specifically a shift away from actuality as opposed to the ideal, and towards a 
blurring of the two poles that destabilises and perhaps obviates the subversive power of Marx’s 
transgression and therefore, maybe, even the possibility of spectral haunting that Derrida derives 
from it. 
Spurred especially by the internet, consumer society has shifted in various ways away from 
the rational transactions of homo oeconomicus. Advertisers increasingly sell lifestyle aspirations in 
the form of ‘content marketing’ rather than specific products, while social media has invited the rise 
and commodification of user-generated content, culminating in the phenomenon of on-brand 
‘influencers’ who make a living through the hybridisation of stealth marketing and social 
communication. As powerful voices become ever more brazen in their disdain for even the illusion of 
open and honest rational discourse, with demonstrable hypocrisy seeming no longer a barrier to 
success (electoral or otherwise), the traditional liberal mechanisms for holding such voices to 
account are subsumed – either drowned out or transformed by – the free flow of misinformation 
and unverified ‘news’. As Derrida prophetically noted,  
[e]lectoral representativity or parliamentary life is not only distorted, as was always the 
case, by a great number of socio-economic mechanisms, but it is exercised with more and 
more difficulty in a public space profoundly upset by tele-techno-media apparatuses and by 
new rhythms of information and communication, by the devices and the speed of forces 
represented by the latter, but also and consequently by the new modes of appropriation  
they put to work, by the new structure of the event and of its spectrality that they produce 
(both invent and bring up to date, inaugurate and reveal, cause to come about and bring up 
to light at the same time, there where they were already there without being there: it is the 
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relation of the concept of production to the ghost that is in question here). This 
transformation does not affect only facts but the concept of such ‘facts’ (1994: 98).  
It is emphatically not our intent to lament the loss of a fictional golden age of truth and integrity, but 
rather to trace the disintegration of the constellation of interrelated binaries that surround and 
sustain the relationship between the actual and the ideal. It is not hard to perceive a widespread 
anxiety that everything is now fake, that the actual has become entirely obscured by the simulations 
and misdirections of a consumer culture growing exponentially more digital by the day. If the 
spectral power of Marx, of communism to-come, originates in historical materialism’s smuggling of 
the ideal into a social universe otherwise beholden to relentless actuality, then it is plausible that 
this power has been cancelled and erased by a present in which the architecture of actuality – 
presence, objectivity, rationality, exchange of equivalents, scientific predictability – makes 
increasingly less sense. The fugitive and delicate messianic hope that Derrida excavates from Marx’s 
spectres, which was a powerful antidote to the Fukuyaman moment, may well have lost its 
purchase. 
As appealing as Derrida’s vision of the ‘to come’ may be, it is fundamentally dependent upon 
the figure of the horizon, of an affective bond with the possibility of something beyond or other than 
that which is. Read in the current moment, one is struck by the difficulty of conjuring such a horizon. 
For many, the glimmer which feeds the sense of connection, promise, hope, seems dimmer now 
than it was when Spectres of Marx was published. Framed in terms of differance, one might say that 
while the differing element holds firm today, the temporal deferring is compromised because the 
horizon upon which it depends is so blurred by digital consumer culture’s bizarre temporality, stuck 
in a moment of permanent crisis where the constant exhortation to ‘follow your dreams’ coexists 
with an apocalyptic sense of imminent and immanent decay. As Noys notes, ‘Derrida’s tendency to 
futural invocations of agency’, his ‘temporal wavering’ (2012: 42-4), presupposes a link to the ‘to 
come’ which the current political enclosures appear to have blocked. The certain idea of justice in 
Spectres of Marx, differed and deferred, relies on an eschatological or messianic promise is at 
present hard to conjure. Without a capacity to hold fast to the promise of the ‘to come’, the future 
appears to be qualitatively cancelled, a quantitative lingering in broken time remaining in its stead. 
Under such conditions, Marx is dead and we have become the spectres. Twenty-five years after the 
publication of Spectres of Marx, then, the critical task must be to learn a politics of transformation, 
resistance, and activation no longer tied to deferrals and promises; a radicalism of and for ghosts. 
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